Abstract: This paper is concerned with the asymptotic behavior of some global quantities relating to weighted decision rules when the number of small voters tends to infinity. First, voting is assumed to be motivated by interests, so that the collective decision is 'preference aggregation'. Here the quantity whose asymptotic behavior is analyzed is the 'complaisance' of the decision-making body which was introduced by Coleman in 1971 as the 'power of a collectivity to act'. Second, decision-making is assumed to be 'truth-tracking', so that there is a right answer but voters only have a partial information and imperfect competence for detecting the truth. The quantity considered here is the collective competence of the decision-making body: the probability of its arriving at the correct decision. This is the problem considered by Condorcet's Jury Theorem. The paper provides a generalization of this celebrated theorem by reinterpreting complaisance in terms of errors in a statistical sense.
Introduction
Decision rules can be characterized in terms of the way in which voting power of individuals is distributed -as represented for example by the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley 1953) or Banzhaf measure (1965) -or by some global values. This paper is concerned with the latter, specifically one that was introduced by Coleman in his 1971 as the 'power of a collectivity to act' and the 'collective competence' as introduced by Condorcet in 1785.
Coleman defined the power of a collectivity to act as the a priori probability that a committee representing this collectivity will be able to pass a random bill that comes before it. The measure is simply the cardinality of winning coalitions divided by all possible coalitions. Formally, a simple voting game (SVG) is a collection W of subsets of an assembly N representing the winning coalitions; hence any S ⊂ N with S / ∈ W is a losing coalition. The power of a collectivity to act A is defined by
where n = |N |. If we read |W| as the number of outcomes that lead to action, then
A is defined as the relative number of voting outcomes leading to action. It reflects the ease with which the individual members' interests in a collective action can be translated into actual collective action. This ease is at a minimum if the collectivity operated under a decision rule in which each member has a veto -unanimity -since only the grand coalition (the total assembly) can initiate action, i.e. A = 1/2 n .
If the committee operates under simple majority rule and has an odd number of members, then exactly half of the coalitions can initiate action (for an even number of members it is slightly less than one half). The power of the collectivity is at a maximum under what Rae (1969) has called a 'rule of individual initiative': where action can be initiated by a single individual, for example when s/he gives a fire alarm. In this case A is obtained by A = 1 − (1/2 n ). Unless n is very small A will be close to one.
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Following Felsenthal & Machover (1998, p.62) we can think of Coleman's A as measuring the propensity of a committee to approve a random proposal, i.e. the complaisance 2 of the rule W.
The interest in Coleman's A is that it allows us to say something about the ability of a collectivity that uses voting to make its decisions not only to act, but as Coleman himself said, '... to act in accord with the aims or interests of some members, but often against the aims or interests of others. Thus for a collectivity of a given size, the greater the power of the collectivity to act, the more power it has to act against the interests of some of the members ' (1971, p. 277) . Aspremont et al. (1987) present axiomatically a general index of aggregate power in organizations which contains Coleman's A as a special case.
As an example for the use of A consider the evaluation of the decision rules for the Council of Ministers (CM) of the European Union (EU). Table 1 and 4 (see Appendix C for the latter) are taken from Felsenthal & Machover (2001) 3 . Table   1 gives the decision rules of the CM from 1958 to 1995. The greatest number of issues in EU parlance, except those concerned with the constitution of the EU itself, is decided by a rule known as qualified majority voting (QMV). From from 1958 to 1995, the QMV has been a purely weighted decision rule. In a weighted voting game each board member is assigned to a non-negative number as weight and a proposed act is adopted if the combined weight of those affirming it achieves a fixed absolute quota. Table 4 is taken from the Treaty of Nice (2001) and represents the decision 1 This generally reflects the situation in which a public good, or a public bad, can be supplied by only a few members of a collectivity. 2 Alternatively Felsenthal & Machover introduce a resistance coefficient R which is a simple linear transformation of A, however, R allows for easier comparisons of decision rules. We shall focus on A simply because it is technically easier to handle than R.
3 For further work on evaluating decision rules for the CM consider e.g. Baldwin et. al. (2000) and Leech (2002) . Table 1. QMV weights and quota, first five periods   Country  1958  1973  1981  1986  1995  Germany  4  10  10  10  10  Italy  4  10  10  10  10  France  4  10  10  10  10  Neth'lnds  2  5  5  5  5  Belgium  2  5  5  5  5  Lux'mbrg  1  2  2  2  2  UK  10  10  10  10  Denmark  3  3  3  3  Ireland  3  3  3  3  Greece  5  5 Note: 'Total ' gives the total weight sum. 'Quota' is the absolute quota; 'Quota %' indicates the relative quota; 'min#' gives the least number of members whose total weight equals or exceeds the (absolute) quota; 'A %' is the Coleman index (1) in percentage terms.
rule designed for the QMV in the EU's Council of Ministers following its prospective enlargement to 27 member states 4 . 'A very important fact, which is apparently not widely realized, about weighted decision rules is that if the quota is pegged at a constant 4 The decision rule is not stated in the treaty in this simple form, as a weighted voting game; but it can be reduced to the form shown in Table 4 . For details see Felsenthal & Machover (2001, Section 3) . 5 Here, we are paraphrasing Felsenthal & Machover who quote this phenomenon in terms of resistance.
percentage of the sum of weights, and if the percentage is greater than 50%, then as the number of voters increases the complaisance tends to fall ...'
Felsenthal & Machover do not provide a proof of this claim, which has major practical importance, particularly for ex ante evaluation of committee design. If it is generally true, then it seems to suggest that as a committee expands we may have to adjust the quota in order to avoid creating an undue bias in favor of the status quo. However, this would disregard the fact that the exercises to decide upon usually differ in an essential way:
(1) Preference aggregation: A decision has to be made aggregating the views or interests of its members.
(2) Truth-tracking: There is a true ordering of the alternatives, i.e. from 'best to worst', and the task is to make the best ('truest') collective choice.
(for the terminology, see for example List & Goodin 2001) .
For preference aggregation consider e.g. a decision of a political body on how to distribute subsidies or a decision by shareholders whether to replace the board.
Such a process is typically concerned with choosing among alternative proposals for action on the relative merits of which the members hold different views.
However, truth-tracking asks for a decision from an epistemic point of view. Here, it makes sense to rate a decision in terms of 'optimality': the 'true' ordering of alternatives is, for example, an ordering from best to worst in terms of some ideal standard or criterion, such as the public interest or justice or efficiency, and the group is concerned to make the 'best' or 'correct' choice. This paper is concerned with the asymptotic behavior of complaisance and collective competence in weighted voting games when there are many small voters.
Literature refers to this setup as 'oceanic games', however, research on asymptotic properties is almost exclusively concerned with individual voting power measures.
To refer to the two classical indices, the work of Shapiro & Shapley (1978) gives an analysis of what happens to the Shapley-Shubik index in weighted majority games when the number of small voters tends to infinity. Dubey & Shapley (1979) investigate the corresponding properties of the Banzhaf index.
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The formal setup of this paper assumes that the voters are of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of 'major' voters with fixed weights (the atomic part), and a growing population of 'minor' voters whose total weight is also fixed but the individual weight of each minor voter becomes negligible (the non-atomic part). The paper provides a proof of the claim of Felsenthal & Machover as quoted above.
Furthermore, it shows that although complaisance and collective competence differ conceptually the latter can be derived by a reinterpretation of complaisance in terms 6 In terms of affinity the present paper is closer to the paper of Dubey and Shapley (1979) since the Banzhaf and the Coleman measure are based on the same behavioral assumptions.
of errors in a statistical sense. This interpretation provides a formulation of collective competence by means of complaisance and hence allows the direct application of the asymptotic results of complaisance to the asymptotic behavior of collective competence.
Outline of the paper: We shall find that the (weighted) majority quota (50 percent quota) has an outstanding role. For weighted non-atomic games the paper shows that the 50 percent (weighted) majority rule is optimal with respect to both preference aggregating and truth tracking. The latter result is a generalization of the celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem to weighted oceanic games. 7 In presence of big players the main result is that the asymptotic value of complaisance as well as collective competence is obtained by reducing the assembly of the game to the small set of major voters. Likewise the 50 percent (weighted) majority rule has an outstanding role. For preference aggregation this majority quota guarantees a suitable level of complaisance since this quota precludes the extreme values of zero (paralyzation) and one (anarchy). If the committee is interpreted as a knowledge aggregation machine heading for the truth of a matter, then this shift increases the probability that jury competence reaches infallibility. Moreover, the paper estimates the rate of convergence which turns out to be very high under reasonable smoothness conditions.
Hence the limit values of both complaisance and collective competence serve as a convenient rule of thumb for large committees that apply weighted voting.
Section 2 sets up the probabilistic machinery that will be used throughout the paper. Section 3 formally defines the general setup of the games. Section 4 discusses the passage of the Coleman index A to the limit when the number of small voters grows to infinity. As an example Section 5 discusses the application of the results of the foregoing sections to the CM of the EU. Section 6 introduces the classical formulation of Condorcet's jury theorem. Section 7 proves a generalization of the latter which allows to discuss the previous results from an epistemic point of view.
7 Condorcet's statement refers to the simple majority rule -a simple and special case of a weighted voting game (an act is adopted if more voters vote for it than against it).
Section 8 provides statements estimating the rate of convergence. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Preliminaries
Let N be a nonempty finite set to which we shall refer as assembly. The elements of N are called voters and we shall often identify them with the integers 1, 2, ..., n,
where n = |N |. A play of the voting game consists in a division, 8 in which each voter chooses one of two options (usually, 'yes' and 'no'). Any subset of S ⊆ N is called a coalition.
Definition 2.1. A weighted voting game -briefly, WVG -
is given by an assignment of a non-negative real weight w k to each voter k ∈ N , and a relative Quota c ∈ (0, 1) such that a coalition S ⊂ N is a winning coalition iff
The loose inequality ≥ in (3) may be replaced by the strict inequality >. In this case we shall use the notation (4) < c; w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n > .
We shall represent the choice of a voter k ∈ N by a random variable X k such that
Our main tool, borrowed from probability theory, is a derived from a general version of the central limit theorem. We shall use the symbol Φ to denote the standard normal distribution. Let {X k } ∞ k=1 be a sequence of independent random variables, at least one of which has a non-degenerate distribution. Let the distribution of X k be denoted by F k , its expectation by E [X k ] = µ k and assume its variance
Theorem 2.1. For each k, let the independent random variable X k be given by
where the C k are real-valued random variables with the same non-degenerate distri-
In order that
it is necessary and sufficient that the following condition be satisfied:
For a proof see Appendix A.
Remark 2.1. For discussing the asymptotic properties of the global measures we shall use the normal distribution as an approximation tool. Theorem 2.1 validates this method (6) iff the weights of the voters are not too skewed (7) (iff the relative weights converge uniformly to zero).
General Setup
Consider a partition of the set of voters N into two camps: we will denote the set of major voters in N by L which is given by {1, ..., l}, where l is a natural number. Note that l = 0 takes care of the case where L is empty by the general convention that {1, . . . , 0} is empty. The set of minor voters in N is denoted by
We shall consider weighted voting situations as follows: there is a fixed quota c and a fixed set of major voters L, where each major voter is endowed with a fixed voting weight. These weights sum up to w L , the combined voting weight of L. There is also a fixed total combined voting weight α of the minor voters M (ν) such that the total weight sum is a fixed constant
However, the population number of M (ν) grows to infinity whereas the individual weight of any minor voter tends to zero. Hence M (ν) represents the non-atomic part of the game.
Let {Γ (ν) } ν∈N be a sequence of WVGs, as follows
for a fixed α > 0, and
Remark 3.1. Note that (11) ensures
However, it can be shown that Q (ν) tends to zero so that condition (11) is stricter than (12). 
Complaisance in WVGs
In the following we shall generalize Coleman's assumption that each coalition is equally likely.
Assumption 4.1. We assume that the minor voters act independently and make an affirmative vote with probability p ∈ (0, 1).
We shall use the notation w(B) := k∈B w k for the sum of the weights of the
as the random weight sum of the affirming minor voters S, where S is a random subset of M (ν) .
Let the random variable Y denote a random coalition among the major voters.
From Definition 2.1 of a WVG and complaisance (1) we get
Due to Assumption 4.1 we should expect that in the limit the continuous 'ocean'
of randomly voting minor voters would be divided such that the affirming voters represent pα of the total minor weight sum α. In other words we should expect a p share of the minor voters stating 'yes'. This suggests to focus on the following
Let B l denote the unanimity game which consists of the grand coalition L only.
Let B * l denote the dual 10 of B l , representing what Rae (1969) has called a 'rule of individual initiative': any coalition with size larger than or equal one is winning.
2 also goes to 0. 10 The dual of v is the game v * , with the same grand coalition L as v, such that, for every
Theorem 4.1. In the sequence of games described by (9)-(11), we have
For other values of c we have
For a proof see Appendix B. 
An Example: the EU Council of Ministers
This section applies the results on complaisance to the evolution of CM of the EU since 1958. The substantial characteristic of the process is that with each enlargement of the EU the maximal normalized voting weight decreases while the relative quota was kept more or less constant at 71% as indicated by Table 1 and Table 4 .
Hence the development of the CM can be described by games
with an empty atomic part, i.e. we put the set of major voters L = ∅. We shall identify the five scenarios from 1958 − 1995 and the QMV following its prospective enlargement to 27 as sequence elements Γ (6) , Γ (9) , ..., Γ (15) , Γ (27) , where the index denotes the size of the Council. Without loss of generality put α = 1. The second row of Table 2 suggests that these games can be interpreted as elements of a sequence satisfying condition (11).
Following Coleman we set p = 1/2. The limit scenario for non-atomic weighted voting games (i.e. no major voters) is depicted by the horizontal axis w L = 0 in Table 2 . Evolution of the CM 27) . . . α are the corresponding realizations of c in CM as given by Table 1 and Table 4 . The step function in the front indicates the limit values with increasing number of voters.
As a reference scenario, Figure 5 .2 provides the same picture for the symmetric weight distribution 'one person one vote' with α (ν) k = α/ν for all k = 1, ..., ν which are qualitatively similar to the setting of the CM.
In all scenarios we observe that convergence tends to be relatively quick for c = 0.5. Table 1 indicate that the decrease of A had its origin partly in a slight increase in the quota from 70.59% in Γ (6) to 70.69% in Γ (9) and 71.43% in Γ (10) . Row A 71 in Table 3 gives complaisance of the voting systems if the quota c had been kept at constant 0.71% which represents the arithmetic mean of the quotas from 1958 -1995. In this case the first scenario would have started already with a lower value A Γ (6) and hence the difference in comparison to the subsequent scenario would have been less significant. In fact, with a fixed quota c = 0.71 complaisance would have increased from 1973 to 1981. The research in this section is rooted in a tradition which goes back to Condorcet (1785). Consider a group N confronting a dichotomous choice, while the members of the group are all assumed to possess more or less reliable perceptions of which alternatives 'ought' to be chosen. The fundamental premise is that there exists some procedure-independent fact of the matter as to what the best or right outcome is. We shall base the discussion on the following cover story: assume that in a jury trial the probability that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged is θ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence there is a truth independent of the jury, yet unknown to the jury members. We will assume that each member k possesses a more or less reliable perception about the truth. This degree of knowledge is modelled by p k ∈ (0, 1), the judgemental competence of voter k. It is the probability that the voter will make the correct choice (the 'better') of the two available to him or her. If the proposal to be voted upon is whether the defendant shall be convicted then p k is the probability that k votes 'yes' if the defendant is guilty, 'no' if he is innocent respectively. The jury's competence or collective competence is measured by the likelihood of the verdict being correct. For a given voting game Γ let C[Γ] denote the probability that the decision rule in Γ leads to a correct choice. We shall refer to C[Γ] as jury competence or group judgemental accuracy.
11 We further define M n as the simple majority game. This is the game whose winning coalitions are just those subsets of the voter set N with cardinality larger than n/2, i.e. M n = {S ⊆ N | |S| > n/2}.
Condorcet's Jury Theorem provides a statement for the jury competence of M n .
Assume for simplicity n to be odd and put m = (n + 1)/2.
Theorem 6.1. (Condorcet Jury Theorem) (Condorcet, 1785 ; see also Grofman et al., 1983) Assume that the voters' choices are independent of one another and are homogenous, i.e. the probability that voter k's choice is correct is given by p k = p for all k ∈ {1, 2, , . . . , n}. Then
is monotonically increasing in n and The result says that if each voter makes the correct choice with a given probability larger than 1/2, the correct option of being the majority winner converges to certainty monotonically as the number of voters tends to infinity. This result constitutes an important pro-democratic argument and has been extended in many ways by statisticians, economists, political scientists, etc. For example, Shapley & Grofman (1984) show that the decision rule that maximizes jury competence is a 11 For the terminology, see for example Shapley & Grofman (1984) .
weighted majority voting rule that assigns weights w k equal to log[p k /(1 − p k )] to any voter k. For our purpose to offset the results in context of Coleman's A of the previous sections, we shall prove a generalized statement for weighted majority games when there are many small voters as defined by the setting (9) -(11).
Generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem
Assumption 7.1. (homogeneity) There are exactly two alternatives, only one of which is correct (or equivalently, one of which is 'better' than the other) with probability θ ∈ [0, 1]. We fix an arbitrary real p ∈ (0, 1) and assume that each minor voter k + l ∈ M (ν) acts independently and makes the correct choice (i.e. the 'better' choice) with probability p.
For our purpose it will prove useful to decompose C into probabilities of avoiding errors of Type I and II in a statistical sense. Let C I denote the probability of avoiding a Type I error or equivalently (1 − C I ) the probability of a true hypothesis being rejected. In terms of the cover story it implies that if the hypothesis is that the defendant is guilty C I is the probability that a guilty defendant will be convicted.
Analogously, let C II denote the probability of avoiding an error of Type II i.e. that an innocent defendant will be found guilty. Jury competence then follows as
For the moment, put θ = 1 (the defendant is guilty). Hence the correct choice is an affirmative vote. We can then interpret C = C I as complaisance of the jury since an affirmative outcome leads to conviction of the defendant. In this interpretation Theorem 4.1 is a statement about jury competence avoiding an error of Type I.
Note that there is no need to specify the competence of the major voters. Their competence enters generally by means of the major collective competencies of the games Γ 0 and Γ 0 , the games B l and B * l respectively. The results for p > 0.5 are illustrated in Figure 7 .1.
The scenario is topologically equivalent to Figure 4 .1. However, p > 0.5 has led to a distortion effect of the inner area.
For θ = 0 we have that C = C II is the likelihood that an innocent defendant is found 'not guilty' in which case voting 'no' is the correct choice. This implies that the voters vote 'yes' with probability (1−p) leading to a distortion effect of the inner area opposite to the shift of Figure 7 .1, as well as another adjustment of the quotas of the games played among the major voters by replacing p by (1 − p) in (14). Figure 7 .2 illustrates this scenario -a precise statement is given in Theorem 7.1. In the following let the additional argument p stress the dependance of the minor voters' competence, the probability of the minor voters' affirmative vote respectively.
Group competence follows as
In summary, we get Theorem 7.1. (Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem) In a jury trial, let the probability that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged be given by θ ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that the minor voters' choices are independent of one another and are homogenous, i.e. the probability that voter k's choice is correct is given by
In the sequence of games described by (9) - (11) the jury competence follows as
where C I is given by
C II is given by replacing p by 1 − p. The result of Theorem 6.1 -the classical version of Condorcet -is indicated by the point marked with ' * ' on the horizontal axis w L = 0. However, the statement of Condorcet refers to the special symmetric case where any (minor) voter has the same voting weight. Theorem 7.1 states that at (c, w L ) = (0.5, 0) the collective competence of any non-atomic game under the condition (9) -(11) tends to one.
The convergence behaves qualitatively similar to the convergence of complaisance A as discussed in Section 8. Thus the limit C serving as an approximation for finite real-world scenarios is justified in (c, w L ) areas with high convergence rates.
Convergence Characteristics
According to (13) complaisance A can be derived as finite sums of (weighted) terms in the shape of
These determine the convergence behavior which in turn hinges on the relation of z to the mean value µ = pα of the random variable α (ν) (S). We shall see that the rate of convergence is high if z = µ and if the distribution of the minor votes is reasonably smooth. This is due to the fact that under the smoothness condition the 'tails' of the sum of random variables display high convergence rates. In the following analysis of A we shall focus on weight distributions of the major voters and the quota c such that z = µ is always matched. Similar results for collective competence C follow easily by the fact that it can be derived by A by means of an easy linear combination (see (22)).
For a 'tail' estimation we shall exclude the set P given by (25) P := {c | c − w(B) = pα for some B ⊆ L} .
Note that P is a null set under the uniform distribution.
be a sequence of independent real-valued random variables such that |Z k | ≤ 1 for all k. Let further {c k } ∞ k=1 be a sequence of real constants such that
for each number δ > 0.
For a proof see Kemperman (1964) .
Theorem 8.1. In the sequence of games defined by (9) - (11) we have for c / ∈ P
where λ is a positive constant.
Proof. For a fixed ν let
max with probability p, 0 otherwise,
From (26) follows
This setting allows us to identify theZ in (27) with α (ν) (S) − µ, where µ = pα, and we get from (28)
for any positive number δ > 0. Putting ε := δs yields the reformulation
Finally, from definition (13) follows that A Γ (ν) is a weighted sum of finitely many terms where each term can be estimated by (32). For c / ∈ P we have ε > 0 for each of those terms which proves (29).
From Theorem 8.1 follows that the rate of converges hinges on
max . Note that this term also reflects the ratio of α (ν) max to the mean minor weight α/m (ν) . If the weight distribution among the minor voters is sufficiently smooth so that
tends to zero sufficiently fast we can expect high rates of convergence as indicated by (29) . For the symmetric case α
We shall see that if the number of voters increases in non-atomic games, while at the same time the quota is pegged at a constant percentage, the scenario is qualitatively comparable to the 'one person one vote' situation (the symmetric case).
However, there is a distortion effect due to unequal weight distribution. The following theorem provides a statement for l = 0 and p = 1/2, considering the ratio
Theorem 8.2. Let α 1 , ..., α m (ν) be positive numbers totalling α, and S a random subset of M (ν) . If every subset is equally probable then for any ε > 0,
where θ denotes α
For a proof see Hoeffding (1963).
Concluding Remarks
We agree with the claim of Felsenthal & Machover that for non-atomic games if the quota is pegged at a constant percentage which is greater than 50% then as the number of voters increases complaisance tends to fall. The non-atomic setup generally reflects the scenario when the distribution of the voting weights of a large committee is not too skewed (in other words, if the ratio of the largest weight to the smallest is not very high). Examples are the US Presidential Electoral College or the CM of the EU.
It is tempting to criticize the impact of this result on complaisance because it is based on the assumption of each 'yes' and 'no' choice being equally likely. This assumption does not match the observation of many real-world voting scenarios, as for example the CM: when it comes to voting the affirmative votes usually represent a majority. However, this argument disregards two essential aspects of measuring the power of a collectivity to act.
First, complaisance as introduced by Coleman (1971) is in the spirit of a priori analysis. Contrary to actual (a posteriori) analysis, it models the voting system as an 'abstract shell', without taking into consideration voters' preferences, the range of issues over which a decision is taken or the degree of affinity between the voters.
This abstraction seems to be necessary to evaluate the decision rule itself. Roth for example, long before the specific issues to be voted on arise or the specific factions and personalities that will be involved can be identified.'
Second, a vote held is usually the result of a foregoing bargaining process. Before the formal vote is taken there is usually a whole series of shadow or straw divisions -which comes to a halt when a majority can be expected. 12 In that sense, complaisance can be thought of as measuring the barrier that members of a committee have to overtake via negotiations and bargaining in order to approve a given proposal.
A decreasing A increases this barrier which is usually reflected by a long pre-vote period -a clear indicator of paralysis.
However, the generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem has shown that if the intention is to arrive at a collective decision in terms of a 'correct' judgement (truthtracking), the prognosis of the assembly's reliability depends on the competence level of its members. The variety of the issues to vote upon suggests a symmetric a priori setting of θ to 1/2 (note that values for θ other than 1/2 make sense if the jury is e.g. exclusively concerned with penal jurisdiction; in this case θ could represent a measure of the crime rate). For non-atomic games Theorem 7.1 implies that if the committee acts as a jury with more or less homogenous competence of its members p > 0.5, then the ex ante evaluation of an expanding committee is positive: in the worst case the judgemental competence tends to 50% if p ≤ c. For p > c , however, the committee tends to infallibility with an increasing member set. Therefore, the pessimistic prognosis for an expanding committee with decreasing complaisance does not hold on epistemic grounds.
The classification of problems into two main categories has also an impact on the assessments of large decision making bodies with an atomic part. These are characterized by a small set of voters with a large voting weight and a large 'pool' of small voters -a typical scenario in, for example, shareholding (the main stockholder of a company might hold 10 percent of total shares while the other stockholders' holdings are very small). Likewise the 50% quota has an outstanding role. For preference aggregation this majority quota implies a suitable level of complaisance, as measured by A since it excludes the areas where A tends to he extremes 0 and 1.
If the committee is interpreted as a knowledge aggregation machine heading for the truth of a matter this shift increases the probability that the jury is infallible.
12 Also, many committees as e.g. the CM seem to publish only positive outcomes, i.e. when acts have been adopted. 
for every fixed ε > 0.
For a proof see e.g. Petrov (1975) , p.100-101. We put
Lemma A.1. For each k, let the independent random variable X k be given by
where the C k are real-valued random variables with the same non-degenerate distribution on a compact set [a, b] for all k ∈ N. Then {X k } ∞ k=1 satisfies the Lindeberg condition (35) iff where λ 1 and λ 2 are reals independent of k, with λ 2 > 0 (since each C k has a non-degenerate distribution). Hence (40) s n = λ 2 Q (n) .
Now suppose the Lindeberg condition (35) is satisfied. Then by Theorem A.1 we have (33), from which (37) follows at once in view of (39) = 0.
For any ε > 0 fix n so large that w k / Q (k) < ε for all k > n . Thus, for all n > n we have w k
< ε for k = n + 1, ..., n.
Thus (41) holds. Now observe that for every k, the integral in (36) follows as
But from |x − λ 1 w k | = |y − λ 1 |w k for all y ∈ [α, β] and (41) it follows that, for any given ε > 0, if n is sufficiently large, then |y − λ 1 |w k < ελ 2 Q (n) for all y ∈ [α, β] and all k ≤ n. That implies the integral (42) vanishes for all k ≤ n. Hence (35) holds. ).
With increasing ν the standard deviation s (ν) from (46) tends to zero. This implies that in (47) the sign of the term (z/α − p) determines whether the argument of Φ converges to infinity or is constantly zero. This provides (43).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For the terms in (13) For c ∈ J the games Γ 0 and Γ 0 are well defined, and for any B ⊆ L for which the limit of Prob α (ν) (S) ≥ c − w(B) is 1 we have that B is a winning coalition in both Γ 0 and Γ 0 . If the limit is 1/2 the coalition B is winning in Γ 0 but not Γ 0 . This yields for ( 
